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This paper aims at evaluating the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates 
during the 1994 currency crisis in Turkey in order to explain whether high interest rates had 
the effect of appreciating the nominal exchange rates. Using weekly data and applying a 
vector error-correction model, it is found that raising interest rates had the significant long-run 




A standard policy prescription in exchange rate crises has been raising the interest rates as 
a way of tightening the monetary policy in order to stabilize the exchange rate. The 
relationship between interest rates and exchange rates during crises has been the subject of a 
controversial literature and this controversy became more intense in the aftermath of the East 
Asian currency crisis. As a condition of the IMF program, the Asian crisis countries 
implemented tight monetary policies and raised the interest rates substantially, the results of 
which have been analyzed in different papers. 
 
The traditional view about the relationship between exchange rates and interest rates 
stresses that raising the interest rates support the exchange rates in a crisis. Higher interest 
rates raise the return that an investor obtains by investing in the country and therefore reduce 
the capital flight. Also, by increasing interest rates, it can be made very costly for speculators 
to take short positions in the currency under attack, and therefore speculation may be 
discouraged. Tight monetary policy can also signal the commitment of the monetary authority 
to defending the currency and be effective in restoring the confidence. These together support 
the currency and lead to an exchange rate appreciation. 
 
On the other hand, several economists defend a revisionist view arguing that raising 
interest rates during the crises may further weaken the currency. High interest rates worsen 
the financial position of the debtors, inducing bankruptcies and raising the default 
probabilities. Even though a higher interest rate, by itself, may make investment in local 
currency-denominated assets more attractive, higher default probabilities and riskiness may 
offset this effect and discourage the foreign investors. Reduction in the net worth of firms as a 
result of increasing interest rates can lead to bankruptcies which in turn affect the firms' 
creditors and the banking sector. This can lead to a credit crunch and worsen the financial 
situation, resulting in capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation. It is also pointed out 
that interest rates have to be increased to very high rates in order to make domestic investment 
attractive. This view has been defended strongly by Furman and Stiglitz (1998) and Radelet 
and Sachs (1998). 
 3 
This paper aims at examining the relationship between the interest rates and exchange 
rates in Turkey during the 1994 crisis using the methodology of Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang 
(2002) in order to understand whether higher interest rates led to an appreciation of the 
currency. Results of the vector error-correction estimation imply that raising interest rates has 
had the long-run effect of depreciating the exchange rate supporting the revisionist view. 
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, the theoretical and empirical 
aspects of the relationship between interest rates and exchange rates are reviewed. The 
behavior of the interest rates and exchange rates in Turkey during 1994 crisis is presented 
with graphs in section 3. In section 4, the methodology and the results are explained and 
section 5 is the conclusions. 
 




The relationship between interest rates and exchange rates is given by the uncovered 
interest parity equation: 
 
where it is the domestic interest rate at time t, it* is the foreign interest rate at time t, et is the 
domestic exchange rate at time t, Et (et+1) is the expected exchange rate at time t+1, and RPt is 
the country risk premium at time t. Risk premium incorporates both the exchange rate risk 
premium and the default risk premium on domestic bonds. 
 
According to the uncovered interest parity condition, a rise in the domestic interest rates 
will lower et; appreciate the exchange rate if Et (et+1) and RPt are kept constant. This is the 
effect that is suggested by the traditional view. 
 
However, the constancy of Et (et+1) and RPt are questionable at times of crisis. Increases in 
the interest rates may increase the borrowing costs of corporations, induce bankruptcies, hurt 
the banking system worsening the financial situation and leading to a capital flight. Therefore, 
risk premium can be positively correlated with interest rates. In terms of the uncovered 
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interest parity equation, as it increases, RPt  also increases and if this increase is high enough, 
it can lead to a depreciation of the currency, i.e. an increase in et. This is the perverse effect 
that is defended by the revisionist view. 
 
b) Empirical  Evidence 
 
The empirical work examining the interest rate-exchange rate nexus during crises can be 
divided into two main categories, those using cross-country data, and those using high 
frequency (daily or weekly) time-series data, with the results being mixed in both categories. 
Cross-country studies evaluate the effect of interest rates on exchange rates across many crisis 
episodes in different countries. Among these studies are Goldfajn and Gupta (1999), Furman 
and Stiglitz (1998) and Kraay (2000). 
 
Goldfajn and Gupta (1999) study a large number of currency crisis episodes that have led 
to real exchange rate undervaluations. Defining a successful recovery as one that occurs 
through a nominal appreciation rather than an increasing inflation, they compare the overall 
probability of success with the probability of success for the cases where monetary policy was 
tightened through higher interest rates. They find that except for the cases where both 
currency and banking crises are present, tight monetary policy increases the probability of 
success substantially (from 26% to 37%). 
 
Furman and Stiglitz (1998) look at cases where short-term nominal interest rates have 
been temporarily increased, in a sample of nine developing countries and find that these 
episodes were followed by a depreciation of the currency rather than an appreciation. The 
same result is obtained for all of the countries in their sample but it is significant only for the 
low-inflation ones, which include East Asia. 
 
Kraay (2000) looks at several currency crisis episodes from 1960 to 1997, grouping these 
as successful speculative attacks, the ones that ended in a sharp nominal devaluation, and 
failed speculative attacks, those that did not end in a devaluation, in a sample of 75 developed 
and developing countries. He then checks whether interest rates systematically increase 
during failed speculative attacks and whether raising interest rates increases the probability 
that a speculative attack fails using a probit model. He finds no evidence in favor of the 
conventional wisdom that high interest rates defend currencies during speculative attacks. 5 
 
The other line of empirical work that analyzes the effects of tight monetary policy on 
exchange rates is the time-series studies that use high frequency data. As for the cross-country 
studies, the results of these mostly VAR based time series studies are also mixed. 
 
Goldfajn and Baig (1998) run a VAR model using daily nominal interest rate and 
exchange rate data for five Asian crisis countries (Korea, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand, and 
Philippines). They find no evidence of overly tight monetary policies in these countries in 
1997 and early 1998. With regard to the relationship between interest rates and exchange 
rates, they find that higher interest rates are associated with stronger exchange rates even 
though the effects are insignificant. 
 
In the paper, from which the methodology of this paper is adapted, Dekle, Hsiao, and 
Wang (2002) estimate a VAR model using weekly data to test the effectiveness of tight 
monetary policy on exchange rates in Korea, Malaysia, and Thailand during the Asian crisis 
and its aftermath. Their findings are supportive of the traditional view that raising interest 
rates appreciate the exchange rates thus but the impact is found to be small. 
 
Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang (2001) conduct the same type of analysis for Korea, adding 
bankruptcy rate among the other variables. They again find that higher interest rates lead to an 
exchange rate appreciation. 
 
Among the papers that do not use VAR are Gould and Kamin (2000) and Cho and West 
(2001). Gould and Kamin try to reduce the endogeneity problem of the interest rates by using 
measures of international credit spreads and of stock market returns as proxies for country 
risk premium. Adding these variables to the regressions to better identify the independent 
impact of interest rates on exchange rates, they find that credit spreads and stock prices 
significantly affect the exchange rates during financial crises whereas interest rates do not 
have significant and consistent effects for the five Asian crisis countries that have been 
analyzed. 
 
In contrast with the VAR based models, Cho and West (2001) estimate a structural model 
on weekly data for Korea, Philippines, and Thailand. The way they go about for seeing the 
effect of interest rate increase is testing whether the risk-premium increases and whether this 6 
is enough to cause a depreciation of the exchange rates. As a result they find that an 
exogenous increase in the interest rates led to exchange rate appreciation in Korea and 
Philippines, and to an exchange rate depreciation in Thailand during the crisis period. 
 
In the case of Turkey, there are no papers of which I am aware that analyzes the effect of 
interest rate defense on exchange rates during crises, even though a few papers can be cited 
that examine this effect without specifically looking at the crisis periods. Agenor, McDermott, 
and Ucer (1997) estimate a VAR model in order to examine the links between fiscal policy, 
uncovered interest rate differentials, the real exchange rate, and capital inflows in Turkey 
since the late 1980's. According to their results, an increase in the interest rate differential 
leads to an appreciation of the real exchange rate and the effect is significant. 
 
Berument (2001) uses the spread between the interbank interest rate and the depreciation 
rate of the domestic currency as an indicator of the monetary policy and estimates a VAR 
model covering the period from 1986 to 2000. He finds that tight monetary policy leads to the 
appreciation of the currency. 
 
Aysoy and Kıpıcı (2002) construct a small-scale quarterly macro econometric model of 
the Turkish economy covering the period from 1987 to 2001. They find that an increase in the 
overnight interest rate results in a depreciation of the nominal exchange rate. 
 
3- 1994 crisis in Turkey 
 
Towards the end of 1993, Turkish government was trying to reduce the very high level of 
domestic public debt stock by cutting interest rates on Treasury bills (Celasun, 1998). 
Treasury started to rely on Central Bank's resources instead of domestic borrowing. 
Cancellation of several Treasury auctions and limited domestic borrowing via Treasury 
auctions as a result of this policy, led to an excess liquidity in the market and to pressure on 
the exchange rates in the last months of 1993, which continued in early 1994. This excess 
liquidity caused a run on foreign currency and loss of international reserves. The decrease in 







Parallel to these, the TL dropped from 14,500 in January 1
st to 39,850 in April 7
th against 
the US$, depreciating by more than 100%. A stabilization program was launched on 5
th of 
April and the new monetary program prepared in line with the IMF stand-by agreement was 
put into effect in May. With the taken measures, the pressure on the exchange rate started to 
be reduced starting in May as can be seen in Graph-2 by the appreciation of the exchange rate 



































Looking at Graph-2 it is seen that the overnight interest rate in the interbank money 
market was raised a little bit in the last two months of 1993. In the first months of 1994, 
overnight rate was raised substantially from around 70% to 700% as a reaction to the pressure 
on the exchange rates. By the end of June 1994, overnight rate was reduced to about 30%. 
 
In this paper, the period between the first week of November 1993 and the last week of 
June 1994 is taken since the pressure on the exchange rates starts to decrease starting in May 
as seen by the behavior of the exchange rate and the increase in the international reserves as 
well as the reduction in the overnight rate. The controversy about the effect of interest rate 
defense is only for the crisis periods, and the aim of this paper is to analyze this in the context 
of 1994 Turkish crisis. Therefore, the sample period is chosen to reflect the exchange market 
pressure leading to the depreciation of the currency. 
 
4- Econometric Methodology and Results 
 
In this section, the effects of high interest rates on exchange rates during the 1994 Turkish 
crisis will be analyzed using the econometric methodology of Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang 
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(2002). In their paper Dekle, Hsiao, and Wang estimate a VAR model with the logarithmic 
transformations of the spot exchange rate, the domestic interest rate, and the domestic-US 
inflation rate differential as the variables using weekly data for Korea, Malaysia, and 
Thailand. As there are two opposing views about the role of interest rate defense during 
economic crises, the authors say that the right model for the Asian crisis is unknown and 
structural estimation can lead to biased results. Since a VAR is an unrestricted reduced-form 
model that can correspond to different structural models, they estimate a VAR to avoid the 
possibility of estimating the wrong model. 
 
Applying the same methodology as theirs, the weekly spot exchange rate, domestic 
interest rate and domestic-US inflation rate differential data are used in this paper for Turkey 
from November 1993 to the end of June 1994. This eight month period is chosen to represent 
the crisis period as explained in the previous section. The overnight interest rate is used as the 
domestic interest rate variable, since it represents the policy instrument used by the Central 
Bank to tighten the monetary policy in order to stabilize the movements in the exchange rate. 
 
First, Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) tests are conducted to test for the presence of unit 
roots in the logarithmic transformations of the exchange rate, et, the overnight interest rate, it, 
and the inflation rate differential, pt. The order of lags to conduct the ADF tests are chosen by 
starting from a higher order and reducing the order until the t-statistic corresponding to the 
highest-order lag turns out to be significant. The test statistics and critical values are given in 
Table-1. The test statistics for the stationarity of the levels of et and it, indicate the presence of 
a unit root for both 1% and 5% significance levels whereas for pt, 5% significance level 
indicates stationarity. To be certain about this variable, a Phillips-Perron test is also 
conducted. The test statistic for this test is -2.4226 and the 99% and 95% critical values are -
3.6422 and -2.9527 respectively, which confirms the presence of a unit root for pt, as well. 
The test statistics for the first differences of all of the variables lead to rejection of the null 







Table 1. Unit root tests 
 
Variable  Order  ADF Test Statistic 99% Critical Value  95% Critical Value 
et 
*  3  -2.199883 -4.2949  -3.5670 
it  0  -1.021170 -3.6422  -2.9527 
pt  1  -2.986826 -3.6496  -2.9558 
∆ et  0  -3.988588 -3.6496  -2.9558 
∆ it  0  -5.427130 -3.6496  -2.9558 
∆ pt  3  -4.183606 -3.6752  -2.9665 
 
* The test for the stationarity of et includes an intercept term and a time trend, the others only 
include intercept terms. 
 
 
Second, the variables are tested for cointegration using the Johansen test. Table-2 presents 
the test results. The first row tests the hypothesis of no cointegration and the second row tests 
the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector. Comparison of the likelihood ratio test 
statistics with the 99% and 95% critical values indicate that no cointegration hypothesis is 
rejected at both significance levels and the hypothesis of at most one cointegrating vector 
cannot be rejected at either significance level. Therefore it is concluded that there is a 
cointegrating vector for the considered variables. 
 











0.697005 47.63341  41.07  34.91  None 
0.220921  10.61819  24.60   19.96  At most 1 
 
* Cointegration test is conducted with an intercept term in the cointegrating vector and no trend in 
the cointegrating vector and in the variables. 
 
 
Since a cointegrating relationship is found between the variables, the appropriate 
estimation procedure is a vector error-correction model. Cointegration implies that there is a 
long-run equilibrium relation between the variables and the short-term dynamics of the 11 
variables are influenced by the deviation from equilibrium. A vector error-correction model 
for the considered variables is of the following form: 
 
where yt = (et, it, pt), ∆ = (1-L) and L denotes the lag operator, α and β are 3 x 1 vectors. β'yt-1 
is the cointegrating vector representing the deviation from the long-run equilibrium of the 
variables and α is the speed of adjustment parameter showing the response to the previous 
period's deviation from the long-run equilibrium. θi, on the other hand, show the impact effect 
of the variables. 
 
To determine the lag order of the model Akaike (AIC) and Schwarz (SC) information 
criteria are used. The minimum value of AIC is obtained with 2 lags whereas SC reaches its 
minimum with 1 lag (values are given in Table-3). To choose between 1 lag and 2 lags, a 
likelihood ratio test is conducted. The likelihood ratio test statistic for the null hypothesis of 1 
lag and the alternative hypothesis of 2 lags is 27.0656 and the chi-square value with 9 degrees 
of freedom for 5% and 1% significance levels are 16.919 and 21.666, respectively. As the null 
hypothesis is rejected at both significance levels, the lag order is taken to be 2 lags. 
 
Table 3. AIC and SC statistics for different lags of the VEC model 
 
Lag Order  AIC  SC 
1  3.202234  3.935102 
2  3.036731  4.193173 
3  3.265439 4.853462 
 
 
Since the lag order is determined to be 2 lags, the estimated model is: 
 
 




t t p t p t t t y y y y y ε α β θ θ θ + + + + ∆ + ∆ = ∆ − − − − 1 2 2 1 1 ' h h
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Table 4. Parameter estimates for the VEC model 
 




















































* Cointegrating vector: 
 
   V = et - 0.909302 it - 0.167367 pt - 6.024920 
              (-3.42107)     (-1.67565)    (-5.59075) 
 
*The numbers in parentheses are the t-statistics. 
 
 
Looking at the estimation results, it is seen that the long-run equilibrium relation between 
the variables takes the form 
 
et = 6.024920 + 0.909302 it + 0.167367 pt 
      (5.59075)    (3.42107)     (1.67565) 
 
The positive and statistically significant coefficient of it indicates that the long-run effect 
of raising the interest rate is a depreciation of the exchange rate, which is in line with the 
revisionist view. This coefficient shows that the long-run elasticity of the exchange rate with 
respect to the interest rate is 0.91. The short-run effect of the interest rate variable is 13 
somewhat ambiguous. The coefficient of ∆it-1 is negative whereas the coefficient of ∆it-2 is 
positive and both of them are insignificant. 
 
Using the estimated model, the impulse response functions of the exchange rate to a one 
standard deviation shock to all of the variables are calculated assuming an ordering of {it, et, 
pt}. This ordering corresponds to the assumption that it is only affected by the lagged values 
of et and pt but not contemporaneously, whereas et and pt are affected by the contemporaneous 
value of it. However, the patterns of the impulse response functions are robust to different 
orderings.  
 


















As seen in the above graph, the initial impact of a shock to interest rate is appreciation of 
the exchange rate which lasts for two periods. From second period onwards exchange rate 
starts to depreciate and this effect lasts for the rest of the periods. The effects of shocks to 
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The estimation results and impulse response function support the revisionist view for the 
1994 Turkish crisis. Even though the increase in interest rates lead to exchange rate 
appreciation on impact, this result is insignificant and the significant long-run result implies 
exchange rate depreciation. The long-run effect starts to exert its influence after two weeks 




In this paper, the relationship between the exchange rate and interest rate has been analyzed 
during the 1994 currency crisis in Turkey using a vector error-correction model. Estimation 
results show that higher interest rates are associated with exchange rate depreciation in the 
long-run, supporting the revisionist view. Even though the impact effect of an interest rate 
increase is exchange rate appreciation, this effect is insignificant. Therefore, it can be said that 
interest rate defense has not been successful in appreciating the exchange rate in the 1994 
Turkish crisis. 15 
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